

4. Machine shop, laboratory, photographic, warehouse and stockroom facilities will remain on Riwetek.

5. The port of entry for aircraft and most supplies will remain on Riwetek.

6. Our radio links with Los Alamos and Oak Ridge will remain on Riwetek.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Col. William S. Cowell, Jr.

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27 March 1953

In short, the only portions of our activities which will move to Bikini will involve a portion of our experiments and personnel. In the past, this has included only a small fraction of Task Force personnel. As strong arguments against this move I would point out that: first, General Clarkeon and I made a firm commitment to the Commission that we would adhere to the concept that Bikini is just another shot island a little further off. In my judgement this suggested move is contrary to that concept. Second, our original argument for the use of Bikini was based on the desirability of not jeopardizing the expensive facilities on Eniwetok and Parry so that they would be usable in future operations. Third, this ignores General Clarkeon's desire to pull the Task Force together on Eniwetok Atoll. Fourth, the placing of shots on Bikini Atoll was designed to minimize evacuation problems. Your proposal to add another five hundred people on a different island of Bikini will give us another complicated operational problem. Fifth, if you think communications were a problem on Ivy, wait until you see the result of scattering the command over three Atolls and 10,000 square miles of ocean. Sixth, I do not understand the philosophy of placing the command in the foremost outpost of the line rather than in the rear where it can supply the front lines and direct their activities. And last, I believe you promised me on the phone that this would never be suggested.


As for moving the Air Task Group to Kwajalein, I can only say that our memories of our Ivy problems are very short. Point One was never able to care for its people on Kwajalein because of communications and distance problems, and the lack of coordination between the Point Four Task Group, the headquarters of the Task Force and Point One were a serious defect in the Ivy Operation. Your break-off of the problem of finding operational weather on Kwajalein, Bikini and Eniwetok simultaneously is a masterpiece. I still think General Clarkeon's desire to pull his command together was, and is, correct.

I would suggest that we discuss this before further action is taken.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
ALVIN C. GRAVES

ALVIN C. GRAVES

ACG:vw
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DAW

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